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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
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This appeal requires us to decide whether the District 
Court erred when it denied a police officer‘s motion to 
dismiss a civil rights action. 
 
I 
 
On the evening of September 28, 2009, fifteen-year-
old Nicole James sent a text message to a friend stating that 
she planned to commit suicide by ingesting ibuprofen pills.  
The friend called 911 and soon thereafter Officer Michael 
Marshall of the Wright Township Police Department arrived 
at the James residence.  Officer Marshall was accompanied 
by two other police officers and emergency medical 
personnel. 
 
When questioned by her parents, Warren and Cheryl 
James, Nicole admitted that she had planned to commit 
suicide, but said that she had changed her mind and had not 
ingested any pills.  Nevertheless, Officer Marshall stated that 
Nicole had to go to the hospital for an evaluation.  Nicole‘s 
parents disagreed, insisting that they wanted to handle the 
matter themselves.  Officer Marshall then ―informed Warren 
and Cheryl that [he] would charge [them] with assisted 
manslaughter if something happened to Nicole because they 
did not send Nicole to the hospital with the emergency 
medical services personnel.‖  Compl. ¶ 50.  Mr. and Mrs. 
James relented and gave permission for their daughter to be 
taken to the hospital. 
 
Officer Marshall then informed Mr. and Mrs. James 
that one of them would need to accompany Nicole.  They 
initially refused, stating that they felt unable to travel because 
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they had taken prescription medication earlier that evening.
1
  
Officer Marshall persisted, however, and Mrs. James agreed 
to go to the hospital with her daughter. 
 
Cheryl James later brought suit against Officer 
Marshall for false arrest and false imprisonment pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne 
County, Pennsylvania.
2
  Officer Marshall then removed the 
case to the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania, and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  In the alternative, Officer Marshall 
argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity.  The matter 
was referred to Magistrate Judge Mildred E. Methvin, who 
recommended that the claims be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim.  In light of this recommendation, the issue of 
qualified immunity was not addressed. 
 
After the Jameses filed objections, the District Court 
rejected Magistrate Judge Methvin‘s Report and 
Recommendation to the extent that it dismissed Mrs. James‘s 
§ 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, and 
                                                 
1
 Mrs. James had taken anti-depression medication and 
had consumed numerous alcoholic beverages.  She alleges 
that the medication left her feeling extremely drowsy.  Mr. 
James had taken heart medication, which had the same side 
effect. 
 
2
 The Complaint pleaded nineteen counts against 
twenty-one defendants.  Only the claims against Officer 
Marshall for false arrest and false imprisonment are at issue 
in this appeal.  We have limited our recitation of the facts and 
procedural history accordingly. 
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denied Officer Marshall‘s motion to dismiss.  James v. City of 
Wilkes-Barre, 2011 WL 3584775, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 
2011).  Officer Marshall appealed to this Court, arguing that 
he was entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
Because the District Court did not address the issue of 
qualified immunity in its opinion, we summarily remanded 
the matter for an explanation as to why it denied qualified 
immunity to Officer Marshall.  Two days later, the District 
Court filed a supplemental memorandum opinion.  James v. 
City of Wilkes-Barre, 2012 WL 425236, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 
9, 2012).  The case is now ripe for disposition. 
 
II 
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order 
doctrine.  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); 
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (―[T]he 
applicability of the [collateral order] doctrine in the context of 
qualified-immunity claims is well established; and this Court 
has been careful to say that a district court‘s order rejecting 
qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage of a 
proceeding is a ‗final decision‘ within the meaning of § 
1291.‖ (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 
(1996))). 
 
Because this case comes to us upon a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations contained 
in the Complaint as true, but we disregard rote recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere 
conclusory statements.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Bell 
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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007); 
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220–21 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  We exercise de novo review of a district court‘s 
denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds 
as it involves a pure question of law.  McLaughlin v. Watson, 
271 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Acierno v Cloutier, 
40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 
III 
 
The doctrine of qualified immunity insulates 
government officials who are performing discretionary 
functions ―from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.‖  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
The Supreme Court has established a two-part analysis that 
governs whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity.  
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  We ask: (1) 
whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the violation of 
a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was 
clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.  Id.; 
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Courts may address the two Saucier prongs in any 
order, at their discretion.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
236 (2009).  If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the 
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See id. at 
232. 
 
A 
 
The first question of the Saucier analysis is whether a 
constitutional violation occurred.  This ―is not a question of 
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immunity, but whether there is any wrong to address.‖  Ray v. 
Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Here, the 
Complaint alleges that Officer Marshall falsely arrested and 
imprisoned Mrs. James when he insisted that she accompany 
her daughter to the hospital in an ambulance. 
 
B 
 
To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth 
Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an 
arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable 
cause.  See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 
(3d Cir. 1995); Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 
(3d Cir. 1988).  The Complaint at issue in this appeal fails to 
allege facts that give rise to a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, Officer Marshall is entitled to 
qualified immunity on this claim. 
 
―Only when the officer, by means of physical force or 
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a 
citizen may we conclude that a seizure has occurred.‖  
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 
269 (3d Cir. 2000) (―A person is seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes only if he is detained by means 
intentionally applied to terminate his freedom of 
movement.‖).  When a person claims that her liberty is 
restrained by an officer‘s ―show of authority,‖ a seizure does 
not occur unless she yields to that show of authority.  
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991); United 
States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2009).  ―[T]he test 
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for existence of a ‗show of authority‘ is an objective one: not 
whether the citizen perceived that [s]he was being ordered to 
restrict [her] movement, but whether the officer‘s words and 
actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.‖  
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628; see also United States v. Brown, 
448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).  We examine the totality of 
the circumstances in determining whether a seizure occurred.  
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437; United States v. Crandell, 554 F.3d 
79, 86 (3d Cir. 2009).  Some factors indicative of a seizure 
include ―the threatening presence of several officers, the 
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of 
the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer‘s request 
might be compelled.‖  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554 (1980); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
194, 204 (2002) (concluding that the defendant was not 
seized because ―[t]here was no application of force, no 
intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no 
brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no 
command, not even an authoritative tone of voice‖). 
 
Mrs. James does not claim that Officer Marshall used 
any physical force.  Instead, she alleges that he made a show 
of authority.  She asserts in the Complaint: 
 
54. None-the-less [sic], the Wright Township 
Police officers insisted that at least one parent 
needed to travel with Nicole to the hospital. 
 
55. Justifiably and reasonably believing herself 
to be compelled by law to do so in reliance 
upon the statements of the Wright Township 
Police officers, Cheryl agreed to accompany 
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Nicole because she believed herself to be in less 
danger than Warren would be if he 
accompanied Nicole. 
 
Compl. ¶¶ 54, 55. 
 
These allegations are insufficient to establish a show 
of authority that rises to the level of a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.  First, the officers‘ insistence that Mrs. 
James accompany her daughter to the hospital would not 
cause a reasonable person to feel powerless to decline the 
officers‘ request or otherwise terminate the encounter.  See 
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly rejected the notion that a seizure occurs when an 
officer approaches a citizen to ask questions or make 
requests.  See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203–04 (no seizure 
when three officers boarded a bus and began questioning 
passengers); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434–35 (no seizure when 
two officers approached a citizen on a bus and requested his 
consent to search his luggage); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 
(no seizure when two DEA agents approached a citizen at an 
airport and requested identification and her airline ticket); see 
also Crandall, 554 F.3d at 84 (―The Supreme Court has made 
clear that a Fourth Amendment ‗seizure does not occur 
simply because a police officer approaches an individual and 
asks a few questions.‘‖ (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434)). 
 
Mrs. James‘s assertion that she ―justifiably and 
reasonably believ[ed] herself compelled by law‖ to comply 
with Officer Marshall‘s request does not alter our conclusion.  
In finding that Officer Marshall violated Mrs. James‘s 
constitutional rights, the District Court reasoned: 
 10 
 
[T]he complaint alleged that the police officers 
asserted their authority and compelled Cheryl 
James to accompany her daughter to the 
hospital.  She alleges that she had no choice in 
the matter, and her freedom of movement was 
thereby intentionally terminated by the actions 
of the police . . . . If she can prove these facts to 
a jury, [she] could prevail on her claim. 
 
James, 2012 WL 425236, at *3.  By crediting these 
allegations, the District Court assumed that Mrs. James was 
―compelled‖ to accompany her daughter to the hospital.  This 
was error because whether she was in fact ―compelled‖ to do 
so is a legal conclusion.  At the motion to dismiss stage, we 
accept as true all factual assertions, but we disregard 
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal 
conclusions, and conclusory statements.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–57; Burtch, 662 F.3d at 
220–21.  Although Mrs. James asks us to accept as fact her 
assertion that she ―justifiably and reasonably believ[ed] 
herself compelled by law,‖ in reality it is a legal conclusion 
artfully pleaded as a factual assertion, which is not entitled to 
a presumption of truth.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 
(―Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must 
take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we 
‗are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as 
a factual allegation.‘‖ (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).  
As far as relevant factual averments go, the Complaint pleads 
only that the officers ―insisted‖ that one parent accompany 
Nicole.  As we have explained, insistence alone is insufficient 
to constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
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Even if we were to consider Mrs. James‘s assertion 
that she felt compelled by law, she does not establish that a 
reasonable person would have felt she had no choice but to 
comply.  See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628; Brown, 448 F.3d at 
245.  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
persuasively explained, a seizure results from  
 
coercive pressure from state actors resulting in a 
significant, present disruption of the targeted 
person‘s freedom of movement.  In our view, a 
seizure typically involves an almost complete 
restriction of movement—either a laying of 
hands or a close connection (both temporally 
and spatially) between the show of authority 
and the compliance (as when a police officer 
tells a suspect to get in the back of the squad car 
but declines to handcuff him). 
 
Kernats v. O’Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1180 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 
Although we acknowledge that intimidating police 
behavior might, under some circumstances, cause one to 
reasonably believe that compliance is compelled, the officers‘ 
actions in this case did not rise to that level.  There are no 
allegations that the officers intimidated Mrs. James with a 
threatening presence, engaged in any physical touching, or 
displayed a weapon.  See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  Nor 
did the officers order her to the police station for questioning 
or threaten to arrest her if she refused to accompany her 
daughter to the hospital.  See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 
812–13, 816 (1985) (finding a Fourth Amendment seizure 
when police approached a citizen at his home, asked him to 
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accompany them to the police station for questioning, and 
threatened to arrest him when he initially refused). 
 
The only fact that might point toward a seizure is 
Officer Marshall‘s threat that Mr. and Mrs. James would be 
charged with assisted manslaughter if they prevented Nicole 
from going to the hospital and she actually committed 
suicide.  But that threat was not made in connection with Mrs. 
James‘s decision to accompany Nicole to the hospital; rather, 
it was made in the context of the parents agreeing to send 
Nicole to the hospital in the first place, which does not 
implicate a restriction on Mrs. James‘s freedom of movement. 
 
Finally, we note that the facts alleged in the Complaint 
differ significantly from the circumstances present in the few 
cases we have located in which a seizure was found based on 
the alleged restraint of a plaintiff‘s freedom of movement by 
an official threat.  See, e.g., White v. City of Markham, 310 
F.3d 989, 992, 995 (7th Cir. 2002) (seizure occurred when 
police officer placed hand on man‘s shoulder and told him 
that if he did not leave immediately, he would be arrested); 
Cassady v. Tackett, 938 F.2d 693, 694–96 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(seizure occurred when executive director of a multi-county 
jail barricaded herself in her office after the county jailer and 
his deputies, brandishing weapons, threatened to kill her and 
her husband).  Tellingly, Mrs. James does not cite any case 
factually similar to hers in which a seizure was found. 
 
For the reasons stated, we hold that Mrs. James was 
not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Having 
found no constitutional violation, we hold that Officer 
Marshall is entitled to qualified immunity. 
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C 
 
Mrs. James also alleges that she was falsely 
imprisoned by Officer Marshall after she was forced to 
accompany her daughter to the hospital.  In this regard, the 
Complaint alleges: 
 
146. Wright Township Police Department 
officers intended that Plaintiff Cheryl James 
should accompany her daughter. 
 
147. Wright Township Police used the force of 
their authority and threat of future arrest to 
compel Cheryl James to leave her home in an 
ambulance. 
 
148. Cheryl James was thereafter confined and 
restrained to the ambulance. 
 
Compl. ¶¶ 146–48. 
 
To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff 
must establish: (1) that she was detained; and (2) that the 
detention was unlawful.  See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 
389 (2007) (―The sort of unlawful detention remediable by 
the tort of false imprisonment is detention without legal 
process.‖ (citations omitted) (emphasis deleted)).  A false 
imprisonment claim under § 1983 which is based on an arrest 
made without probable cause, as Mrs. James alleges here, is 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment‘s guarantee against 
unreasonable seizures.  Groman, 47 F.3d at 636. 
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As we have explained, Mrs. James has not pleaded that 
she was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  
She was urged by officers to accompany her daughter in the 
ambulance, and she agreed to do so.  She was free to leave at 
any time.  Indeed, she does not allege that any Wright 
Township police officers accompanied her in the ambulance 
or even that they proceeded to the hospital separately.  
Accordingly, Mrs. James cannot show that she was falsely 
imprisoned.  Therefore, the District Court erred when it failed 
to grant Officer Marshall qualified immunity on this claim as 
well. 
 
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court. 
